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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE SUPREME COURT
CONSTRUCTS A LIMITED RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
FOR FEDERAL CRIMINAL CONTEMNORS
In an exercise of the discretionary -rule-making authority over the
lower federal courts, the Supreme Court in Cheff v. Schnackenburg
directed that sentences exceeding six months may not be imposed
absent a jury trial or waiver thereof. However, in obliquely with-
drawing the previously asserted constitutional basis for the six-
months limitation, the Court conceivably has undermined the
viability of the criminal contemnor's "right" to a jury -trial. More-
over, in light of the potential conflict between the Cheff directive
and congressional intent, the 'Precise scope and mode of applica-
tion-of the sentencing restriction remains unsettled.
T HE novel equation of "criminal contempts"' with "petty offenses"2
advanced in 1964 by the Supreme Court in United States v. Barnett8
I While contempts have traditionally been categorized as either civil or criminal,
prior to Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966), few meaningful judicial de-
lineations had been made of the characteristics of either classification. See 20 N.Y.U.
INTRA. L. REv. 157, 160-61 (1965). But see Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 595-99
(1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring). The categories have been distinguished on the basis
of the beneficiary of the proceeding: a civil proceeding benefits a private litigant by
securing for him the fruits of a court order, while criminal proceedings vindicate the
court for indignities committed against it. For a statement of and criticism of this
categorization, see Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 CoLuM.
L. REv. 956, 961 (1931); Schneider, Contempt Powers of the Arizona Courts, 8 APz. L.
Rv. 141, 146 (1966). But see McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1939).
In Shillitani, the Supreme Court made it clear that contempts, at least in federal
courts, are differentiated on the basis of the motivation for the initiation of the par-
ticular proceeding: the objective of a criminal contempt is to punish past interferences
while the purpose of civil contempt is prospective, that is, to coerce future actions.
384 U.S. at 368-70. See Murphy, The Contempt Power of the Federal Courts, 18
FED. B.J. 34, 35 (1958); 66 COLUM. L. REv. 182 (1966). Furthermore, it appears that
the distinction is more than a mere idle exercise in legal taxonomy since the procedures
in criminal contempts differ markedly from those in civil contempts. For example,
in criminal proceedings the contempt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, while
in civil proceedings proof by a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient. Murphy,
supra at 35-36. Despite the fact that the civil contemnor can terminate his penalty
by compliance with the court order, civil sentences are often indeterminate in length
rather than for a fixed period. Id. at 35. See generally GOLDFARB, CONTEMPT OF COURT
49-67 (1963) [hereinafter cited as GOLDFARB]; Cowen, Some Observations on the Law
of Criminal Contempt, 7 U. WEST. Ausm. L. REv. 1 (1965); Fox, The Summary Process
to Punish Contempt, 25 L.Q. REv. 238 (1909); 12 WAYNE L. REv. 699 (1966).
2 See note 49 infra.
3 376 U.S. 681 (1964). In Barnett, the defendants, the Governor and Lieutenant
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
foreshadowed a substantial limitation upon the traditional power of
the federal courts to impose criminal sanctions for disobedience of
their orders without according jury trials.4  In dictum, the Barnett
majority asserted that "some members of the Court are of the view
that, without regard to the seriousness of the offense, punishment by
summary trial without jury would be constitutionally limited to that
penalty provided for a petty offense. ' 5 However, the Court's failure
to elucidate clearly the nature and scope of its "petty offense equa-
tion" occasioned continued controversy and confusion among courts
and commentators." In the recent case of Cheff v. Schnacken-
burg,7 the Supreme Court adopted the substance of the "petty offense
equation" to delimit the breadth of the federal courts' discretion
over the prosecution and punishment of criminal contemnors.8  In
so doing, however, the Court's equivocation as to the restriction's
conceptual foundation and scope would appear to pose innumerable
interpretive dilemmas.
Cheff had been charged with criminal contempt of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals for the alleged willful violation of that
court's pendente lite order enforcing a cease and desist order issued
by the Federal Trade Commission.9 Relying upon the Barnett
Governor of Mississippi, were brought before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for dis-
obeying orders issued by that court. They demanded a trial by jury, and the court,
being evenly divided on the question as to whether they were so entitled, certified it to
the Supreme Court under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (1964). The Supreme
Court held that the defendants had neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to
a jury trial. The statutory provisions which provide for jury trial in instances
where disobedience to a district court order also constitutes a crime, 18 U.S.C. §§ 402,
3691 (1964), were held non-applicable since the case involved the order of a court of
appeals. 376 U.S. at 690-92. On the basis of Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165
(1958), and its own historical survey, the Court found no constitutional right to jury
trial. 376 U.S. at 692-700. See notes 38-39 infra and accompanying text. See gen-
erally Tefft, United States v. Barnett, "Twas a Famous Victory," 1964 Sup. Cr. Rxv.
123; The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. Ray. 143, 215 (1964); 29 ALBANY L.
RaV. 138 (1965); 63 MicH. L. REV. 700 (1965); 36 Miss. L. REv. 106 (1964); 25 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 762 (1964).
'See notes 26-39 infra and accompanying text. The federal courts' power
to punish criminal contemnors without the conferral of a jury trial was limited only by
a contrary statutory prescription. See notes 35-37, 65, 95-100 infra and accompanying
text.
r 376 U.S. at'695 n.12. See generally notes 49-51 infra and accompanying text.
0 See note 54 infra and accompanying text.
7 384 U.S. 373 (1966), 33 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 120 (1966), The Supreme Court, 1966
Term, 80 HAav. L. REv. 124, 127-29 (1966), 45 TaxAs L. Ray. 176 (1966).
11384 U.S. at 379-80.
9 The order of Federal Trade Commission against the Holland Furnace Co. and its
officers, including President and Chairman of the Board Paul Cheff, prohibited the
continuance of unfair methods of competition and deceptive trade practices in the
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dictum, the Seventh Circuit denied defendant's demand for a trial
by jury'0 and proceeded pursuant to the summary contempt pro-
cedure required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42 (b).11
After a full hearing before the court of appeals, the defendant was
convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment.12
The Supreme Court, in affirming the conviction, rejected the
defendant's contention that criminal contempt proceedings were
criminal actions within the ambit of article III's and the sixth
amendment,14 which guarantee the right to trial by jury.1  Mr.
Justice Clark, in an opinion joined by three other members of the
Court,' 6 reiterated with apparent approval the constitutional de-
marcation hypothesized in Barnett: the right to a jury trial en-
compasses only those criminal contempts which fall outside of the
"petty offense" category.17 Adopting the definition of a "petty
sale of its products. In the Matter of Holland Furnace Co., 55 F.T.C. 55 (1958). The
cease and desist order was upheld, both as to the jurisdiction of the FTC to enter it,
Holland Furnace Co. v. F.T.C., 269 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1959), and on the merits,
Holland Furnace Co. v. F.T.C., 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1961).
10 In re Holland Furnace Co., 341 F.2d 548, 549 n.1 (7th Cir. 1965).
22 FED. R. CiuM. P. 42 (b): "Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal con-
tempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice.
The notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for
the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the
criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally
by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on application of
the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose,
by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a trial
by jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides. He is entitled to
admission to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt charged involves dis-
respect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the
trial or hearing except with the defendant's consent. Upon a verdict or finding of
guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment."
The Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure state in
paragraph 3 that rule 42(b) "preserves the right to a trial by jury in those cases
in which it is granted by statute, but it does not enlarge the right or extend it to
additional cases." Advisory Committee's Note, 4 F.R.D. 405, 430 (1946). Moore states
that "while these Notes are not officially sanctioned by the Supreme Court, they are
nevertheless persuasive evidence of 'legislative intent' analogous to the notes of legisla-
tive committees accompanying statutes." 8 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACMTCE § 1.02 n.1 (1965).
12 341 F.2d at 555.
'8 U.S. CONSr. art. III, § 2: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeach-
ment, shall be by Jury ...."
1 U.S. CONST. amend. 6: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ..
18 384 U.S. at 378-79.
10 Mr. Chief Justice Warren, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Fortas joined
in the prevailing opinion. Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart concurred;
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Black dissented. Mr. Justice White did not take
part in the case.
17 384 U.S. at 378-79. See also note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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offense" provided by federal statute,' Mr. Justice Clark found that
the Seventh Circuit had not surpassed the prescribed sentence limita-
tion since the penalty imposed in the instant case did not exceed
six months imprisonment. 9 In addition, criminal contempt was
deemed not to be intrinsically so serious as to require classification
as a "crime. ' '20 Therefore, since the defendant had no statutory right
to a jury trial,21 the prevailing opinion concluded that he had been
properly tried without a jury.22  However, in the exercise of the
Court's dual powers to revise contempt sentences and to supervise
the administration of justice in the federal courts, the four Justices
issued the following directive to provide further guidance for the
lower federal courts: "[S]entences exceeding six months for criminal
contempt may not be imposed by the federal courts absent a jury
trial or waiver thereof."23  The dissenters, Justices Douglas and
Black, posited the theoretical applicability of the "petty offense
equation" but found Mr. Justice Clark's six months demarcation
standing alone, unsupportable as a constitutional standard. They
contended that, since Congress has created no class of "petty" con-
tempts, a proper application of the "petty offense equation" consti-
tutionally requires a jury trial for all federal criminal contemnors.2 4
18 18 U.S.C. § 1 (8) (1964): "Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which d6es not exceed
imprisonment for six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both, is a petty
offense." (Emphasis added.)
29 384 U.S. at 380.
20 See ibid.
2 The defendant had no statutory right to a jury trial since the instant case in-
volved a contempt which neither constituted a crime, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 38691 (1964),
nor arose out of a labor dispute, see 18 U.S.C. § 38692 (1964), nor arose under civil rights
statutes, see Civil Rights Act of 1957, § 151, 71 Stat. 638, 42 U.S.C. § 1995 (1964); Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 1101, 78 Stat. 268, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h (1964). See notes 35-37 infra
and accompanying text.
22 384 U.S. at 380.
23 Ibid. While opinions without majority support are often discounted, Mr. Justice
Harlan, in his concurring opinion, indicated that the directive had the support of six
members of the Court: "The decision to extend the right to jury trial to criminal
contempt ending in sentences greater than six months is the product of the views of
four Justices :who rest that conclusion on the Court's supervisory power and those of
two others who believe that jury trials are constitutionally required in all but 'petty'
criminal contempts." Id. at 381.
"4Id. at 391. Assuming congressional prerogative to affect exercises of judicial
discretion in contempt proceedings, see notes 93-101 infra and accompanying text,
any legislative denomination of particular indirect criminal contempts as "petty" must
not exceed the mandates of cases interpreting the sixth amendment right to jury trial.
Thus, Congress must consider the gravity of .the offense and its indictability at com-
mon law. See District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930). While the pre-
vailing opinion in Cheff posits that the intrinsic seriouness of a criminal contempt
does not compel its classification as a "crime," 384 U.S. at 380, indicia exist which sug-
Vol, 1967: 632]
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In contrast, Justices Harlan and Stewart concurred in the judgment
but dissented from the directive, asserting that neither the Constitu-
tion nor sound public policy dictated the conferral of jury trials for
criminal contempt. 25
The divergent viewpoints proffered in the three Cheff opinions
embody the contemporary theories concerning the constitutional
status of criminal contempt proceedings. Justices Harlan and Stewart
adhered to the classical doctrine that criminal contempts are wholly
immunized from the Constitution's jury trial requirements on the
theory that contempt is neither a "crime" under article III nor a
"criminal prosecution" under the sixth amendment. According to
this view, contempt has customarily been denominated an offense sui
generis to which the full complement of constitutional safeguards nor-
mally attendant criminal prosecutions does not attach.26 This unique
gest a contrary conclusion. See note 55 infra. See also 384 U.S. at 391-92 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). More troublesome is the deference to be afforded the sanction which
potentially could be imposed, for the severity of penalty may render "a statutory
offense . . . so serious as to be comparable with common law crimes . . . ." District
of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937). Assuming that the Cheff six-month
demarcation is not constitutionally compelled, see notes 55-56 infra and accompanying
text, the precise limits of the maximum penalty which could be imposed upon a petty
offense and which would not transgress sixth amendment jury trial requirements has
not been specified. The Clawans court held that a ninety-day sentence did not
present sufficient severity to require the empanelling of a jury. 300 U.S. at 625. Other
cases attempting a delineation of the types of sanctions which distinguish petty
offenses from crimes have accepted the six-month delineation set out in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1 (3) (1964). See, e.g., United States v. Schiffer, 351 F.2d 91, 96 (6th Cir. 1965);
United States v. Au Young, 142 F. Supp. 666, 667 (D. Hawaii 1950). However, unless
these courts merely failed to articulate that these limits conform to a delineation which
would have been chosen upon an evaluation of constitutional requirements independent
of the statute, it is difficult to rationalize how a congressional enactment, originally
intended only to do away with "the cumbersome machinery of grand-jury interventions
and the finding of bills," 72 CoNG. RFc. 9992 (1930) (remarks of Representative
Graham), could be deemed a constitutional limitation upon further legislative attempts
to punish summarily. The Fifth Circuit, attempting to assign specific limits to the
Barnett dictum, has concluded that imposition of a penalty of eighteen months im-
prisonment probably requires a jury trial. Randazzo v. United States, 339 F.2d 79, 81
(5th Cir. 1964). Thus, the current status of precedent defining the constitutional
bounds within which offenses may be dealt with summarily places the maximum dura-
tion of imprisonment at some point between six and eighteen months.
25384 U.S. at 381-83.
2 The term "sui generis" is conclusionary; yet the courts have consistently failed
to give further elaboration. In Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95 (1924), the Court
observed that "while contempt may be an offense against the law and subject to
appropriate punishment," since the beginhing of our government "proceedings to
punish such offenses have been regarded as sui generis, and not 'criminal prosecu-
tions' within the Sixth Amendment or common understanding." Id. at 104-05. (Italics
in original.) However, another court stated that it saw "no advantage in rehashing
the discussions on whether criminal contempt is sui generis, offense, crime, or felony.
Criminal contempis are criminal contempts; some of the procedural and substantive
(Vol. 1967: 632
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isolation from the normal requisites of procedural due process has
been rationalized on the grounds that the courts' power to punish
summarily for contempt was well established at common law27 and is
indispensible to the proper functioning of the judicial system.28
However, the federal courts' abuse of the unbridled procedural
discretion sanctioned by the traditional theory has resulted in gradual
mitigation of its pristine absolutism. 29 Initially, the courts, and sub-
sequently Congress, deemed the appropriateness of summary pro-
cedures dependent upon a classification of the contempt as "direct"
or "indirect," the latter occurring outside of the presence of the court
and generally consisting of a violation of a court order.80 While the
law applied to criminal contempts is as though they were crimes, and some of it is not."
Warring v. Huff, 122 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 678 (1941). See Pen-
field Co. v. S.E.C., 330 U.S. 585, 609 (1947); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,
440 (1932); United States v. Goldman, 277 U.S. 229 (1928); Ex parte Grossman, 267
U.S. 87, 117-18 (1925); Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 242 (1914); Gompers v.
United States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914); Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 336-37
(1904); O'Neal v. United States, 190 U.S. 36, 38 (1903); Creekmore v. United States,
237 Fed. 743 (8th Cir. 1916); Merchants' Stock & Grain Co. v. Board of Trade, 201
Fed. 20 (8th Cir. 1912).
One commentator sees the classification of criminal contempts as sui generis as
merely expressing the conclusion that contempt procedures are indispensable to the
proper functioning of the judicial branch and states that the label does not contribute
to a solution of the problems presented by the unique proceedings. See Lane,
The Contempt Power v. the Concept of a Fair Trial, 50 Ky. L.J. 351, 353 (1962).
Some courts have not used the sui generis label but merely held contempts not to
be "crimes." See, e.g., Ex parte Burr, 4 Fed. Cas. 791, 797 (No. 2186) (C.CJ).C.
1823). See also United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964); Green v. United States,
356 US. 165 (1958).
27 See, e.g., Green v. United States, supra note 26, at 185-86; United States v.
Barnett, supra note 26, at 692-93. But see notes 41-42 infra and accompanying text.
28 "It has always been one of the attributes-one of the powers necessarily incident
to a court of justice-that it should have this power of vindicating its dignity, of en-
forcing its orders, of protecting itself from insult, without the necessity of calling upon
a jury to assist it in the exercise of this power." Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134
U.S. 31, 36 (1890). See, e.g., Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 541-43 (1917); Bessette
v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 327, 333 (1904); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 308-
10 (1888); Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 718 (1885); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 204, 228-29 (1821); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
Other important benefits which accrue to the administration of justice through the
summary punishment power include speed of prosecution and punishment, increased
deterrence of contemptuous conduct, avoidance of delays, and promotion of the dignity
of the court. Some commentators have argued that these advantages would be impaired
if courts were forced to rely on prosecutions by the district attorney in a separate pro-
ceeding. See generally Cowen, supra note 1, at 7; 39 So. CAL. L. REv. 463, 467 (1966);
27 U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 723, 725 (1966); 65 YALE L.J. 846, 855 (1956).
2' See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 196 n.5 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting);
25 U. Prrr. L. REv. 762, 764 (1964). Cf. Comment, 58 MicH. L. Rav. 258, 264-66
(1958).
O3See Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307-09 (1888); GOLDFARB 68-69; Lane, supra
note 26, at 353-54; Wright, Byrne, Haakh, Westbrook & Wheat, Civil and Criminal Con-
Vol. 1967: 632]
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procedural requisites for the punishment of direct contempts have
remained relatively unregulated,31 the history of indirect contempt
evinces an increasing propensity on the part of both the courts and
Congress to resolve conflicts between the "demands" of judicial
efficiency and due process to the contemnor in favor of the latter.8 2
At a minimum, federal rule 42 (b) requires reasonable notice and a
hearing for all indirect contempts.8 3 Furthermore, the courts have
gradually accorded nearly the full panoply of procedural safeguards
except the right to trial by grand and petit juries.34 Finally, a statu-
tempt in the Federal Courts, 17 F.R.D. 167, 170 (1955). Conversely, a direct contempt
has traditionally encompassed indignities and interferences of which a court could
take empirical notice. The symetry of the direct-indirect dichotomy, however, has
been somewhat blurred by Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
a'"A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that
he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed
in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and
shall be signed by the judge and entered of record." FED. R. CiM. P. 42 (a). The
only procedural limitation in this solitary statutory provision covering direct contempt
lies in the form of narrow definition of the substantive scope of direct contempt. In
Harris v. United States, supra note 50, the Court held that the application of rule
42 (a) was limited to situations where immediate judicial action is needed to rectify
contemptuous conduct, such as threatening the judge with physical harm or seriously
obstructing the court's proceedings, and that a refusal to testify was not such a situa-
tion. 382 U.S. at 164-65. See Lane, supra note 26, at 376-94; Luther, Recent Trends
Curtailing the Summary Contempt Power in the Federal Courts, 8 HArTINGs L.J. 56
(1956); 51 CORNELL L.Q. 815 (1966); 70 DICK. L. REv. 254 (1966); 1966 DUKE. L.J. 814;
39 TEmp. L.Q. 368 (1966); 27 U. Psrr. L. REv. 723 (1966); 12 WAYNE L. REV. 699
(1966).
32 See GOLDFARB 75-77.
"See note 11 supra.
"Procedural protections granted to contemnors include the following: (1) Im-
munity from double jeopardy. In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 52 (1943). (2) Protection
against self-incrimination. See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924);
Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 447-48 (1911). But see Mer-
chants' Stock & Grain Co. v. Board of Trade, 201 Fed. 20, 27-29 (8th Cir. 1912).
(3) Compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his favor. See Blackmer v. United States,
284 U.S. 421, 442 (1932). (4) The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
See, e.g., Welling v. United States, 9 F.2d 292, 293 (6th Cir. 1925); Stewart v. United
States, 236 Fed. 838, 843 (8th Cir. 1916); Schwartz v. United States, 217 Fed. 866, 870
(4th Cir. 1914). (5) Eligibility for executive pardon. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87,
118-22 (1925). (6) Protection of statutes of limitations. Pendergast v. United States,
317 U.S. 412, 417-21 (1943). (7) The criminal presumption of innocence. Michaelson
v. United States, supra at 66; Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., supra at 444.
(8) The right to an unbiased judge. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 583 (1964); Offutt
v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1954); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539
(1925). (9) The right to a public trial. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-73 (1948).
(10) The right not to be denied free speech. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 394-95
(1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.
331, 546-50 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-78 (1941). (11) The right
to vigorous argument of counsel. Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136-38 (1965).
(12) The right to appeal. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188 (1958); Harris v.
United States, 382 U.S. 162, 171 & n.13 (1965) (dissent). (13) The right to petition
for habeas corpus. Savin, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 267 (1889).
[Vol. 1967: 632
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tory right to trial by jury has been conferred where the act of con-
tempt also constitutes a separate crime,3 5 occurs in connection with
a labor dispute,36 or arises under certain civil rights statutes.37 Never-
theless, despite the aforesaid liberalizing trends, the Supreme Court,
as recently as 1958, in Green v. United States, 8 re-emphasized the
continued viability of the absolute exemption of criminal contempt
from the jury trial requirements of article III and the sixth amend-
ment.39
A second contemporary theory is represented by the position of
Justices Douglas and Black that criminal contempt is within the
ambit of the Constitution's guaranty of the right to trial by jury.
Adherents of this viewpoint in recent years have levelled a vigorous
attack upon the sui generis status of criminal contempts.40 In the
first instance, the historical foundation for the courts' summary
power over contempts is deemed to be of questionable validity. It
85 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 3691 (1964). Specifically exempted from the purview of these
sections are "contempts committed in the presence of the court." The application of
these sections, originally enacted under the Clayton Act, was held not limited to
antitrust proceedings in Sandefur v. Canoe Creek Coal Co., 293 Fed. 379 (6th Cir.
1923), certified question answered, 266 U.S. 42 (1924). See generally Frankfurter &
Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal
Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HAv. L. Rlv. 1010, 1038-42, 1052-58
(1924).
"8 See 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1964). As in the case of contemptuous actions which also
constitute crimes, the guarantees of this section do not extend to direct contempts.
37 Civil Rights Act of 1957, § 151, 71 Stat. 638, 42 U.S.C. § 1995 (1964); Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 1101, 78 Stat. 268, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h (1964). In cases where the sanction
imposed does not exceed a fine of 300 dollars or imprisonment in excess of forty-five
days, the 1957 statute gives a judge discretion to try the contemnor without a jury.
356 U.S. 165 (1958).
39 The defendants in Green were convicted of a violation of the Smith Act and re-
leased on bail while the case was on appeal. When the conviction was affirmed, the
district court signed an order for the surrender of the defendants. For disobedience
of this order the defendants were convicted of criminal contempt and sentenced to an
additional three years imprisonment. In holding that the defendants were properly
convicted without a jury trial, the Supreme Court, without extended discussion, relied
only on past precedent: "The statements of this Court in a long and unbroken line of
decisions ranging from misbehavior in court to disobedience of court orders establish
beyond peradventure that criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial as a matter
of constitutional right." Id. at 183. See generally 25 BROOKLYN L. Rev. 118 (1958);
The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARv. L. REv. 77, 156 (1958); 36 U. Day. LJ. 180
(1958).
10 See GOLDFARB 180-84. The attack upon criminal contempt procedures has in-
creased in recent years. See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1952) (Black,
J., dissenting); Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 167-68 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting);
Ballantyne v. United States, 237 F.2d 657, 667-68 (5th Cir. 1956) (Cameron, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part); Farese v. United States, 209 F.2d 312, 315 (1st ir.
1954). Hostility towards the summary punishment of criminal contempts has existed
to a lesser degree throughout the years, see, e.g, I LIVINGSTON, COMPLETE WORKS ON
CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENcE 258-67 (1873).
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is contended that modern scholarship not only has unearthed no
evidence to support the assertion that the drafters of the Consti.
tution had differentiated between "contempts" and "crimes," 41
but also that it has eviscerated the assumption that summary pro.
cedures were employed under the common law.42  Furthermore, be-
cause of the frequent use of contempt proceedings 43 and the harsh-
" See GOLDFARB 180; Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 245,
261-65 (1959). But see Tefit, supra note 3, at 128-29.
12 Among the most prominent writings examining the historical background of the
contempt power are those of Sir John Fox: THE HISTORY or CONTEMPT OF COURT
(1927); The Writ of Attachment, 40 L.Q. REv. 43 (1924); The Practice in Contempt of
Court Cases, 38 L.Q. REv. 185 (1922); The Nature of Contempt of Court, 37 L.Q. REv.
191 (1921); Eccentricities of the Law of Contempt of Court, 36 L.Q. REV. 594 (1920);
The Summary Process to Punish Contempt, 25 L.Q. R.EV. 238 (1909); The King v.
Almon (pts. I-I), 24 L.Q. REv. 184, 266 (1908). See Comment, 57 MICH. L. REv. 258,
260 (1958): "Fox summed up the procedure to punish indirect contempts as having
been unknown originally at common law, created by the Star Chamber, and later
filtered into common law courts after abolition of the Star Chamber in 1641." This
history was hidden from both American and English courts due to the inaccuracy of
Justice Wilmot's unreported but well-known opinion in Rex v. Almon. See Frank-
furter & Landis, supra note 35, at 1046-50; Goldfarb & Kurzman, Civil Rights v. Civil
Liberties: The Jury Trial Issue, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 486, 488-89 (1965); Comment, 10
KAN. L. RV. 433-34 (1962). See generally GOLDFARB 13-20; 2 HOLVswORTH, A HIsToRY
OF ENGLISH LAW 391-94 (3d ed. 1927); THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 8-9
(1934).
,a An expansion in the applications of the contempt device is largely responsible for
its increased use. For example, federal agencies have no power to punish disobedience
of their orders. See ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894); GOLDFARB 128-29. They must
therefore seek enforcement through the court contempt proceedings provided by various
provisions. See, e.g., Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930, § 12(c), 46
Stat. 536, 7 U.S.C. § 499m (c) (1964) (Dep't of Agriculture); Federal Seed Act §§ 410-11,
53 Stat. 1287 (1939), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1601-02 (1964) (same); Clayton Act § 11, 38 Stat. 734
(1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §21 (1964) (enforcement of FTC, ICC, CAB, and
Federal Reserve Board orders concerning monopolies and combinations); Federal Trade
Comm'n Act § 5 (c), 52 Stat. 112 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (c) (1964) (FTC
orders dealing with unfair methods of competition and deceptive trade practices);
Securities Exchange Act § 21 (c), 48 Stat. 900 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78u (c) (1964) (SEC);
Public Utility Holding Company Act § 18(d), 49 Stat. 831, 15 U.S.C. § 79r (d) (1964)
(same); Small Business Investment Act § 309 (f, added by 75 Stat. 755 (1961), 15
U.S.C. § 687a (f) (1964) (Small Business Administration); Tariff Act of 1930, § 333 (b), 46
Stat. 699, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1333 (b) (1964) (Tariff Commission); National Labor
Relations Act §§ 10(e), 11(2), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e),
161 (2) (1964) (NLRB); Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 231, 68 Stat. 960, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2281 (1964) (Att'y General); Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act § 12 (b), 52 Stat.
1107 (1938), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 362 (b) (1964) (Railroad Retirement Bd.); Com-
munications Act of 1934, § 409 (d), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 4 09 (g) (1964) (FCC); Inter-
state Commerce Act § 12, 24 Stat. 383 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 12 (3) (1964)
(ICC). See also notes 81, 89 infra and accompany text. While some of the enforce-
ment provisions do not expressly provide for contempt proceedings, the contempt
power is indirectly authorized by provisions for enforcement through the courts.
See, eg., H.R. REP. No. 1371, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1935). See generally, Jaffe, The
Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Orders, 76 HARV. L. REV. 865 (1963).
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ness of the penalties imposed therein,4 4 it is argued that summary
criminal punishment is incompatible with modern concepts of
criminal justice, notwithstanding any contrary historical justifica-
tions. The burgeoning acceptance of this defendant-oriented theory
culminated in Green, wherein Mr. Justice Black, speaking for three
members of the four-vote minority,45 concluded that the judicial
precedent upon which the traditional doctrine was based was "wrong
--wholly wrong. 46
The doctrine subsequently temporized in the Barnett dictum
represented an intermediate theory. Although the dictum inti-
mated, for the first time, that a majority of the Justices was prepared
to repudiate the traditional doctrine,47 the Court held that a trial by
jury was not constitutionally required for all indirect contempts. 4s
Rather, the Barnett Court appeared to rely upon Mr. Justice Gold-
berg's assertion in dissent that criminal contempts "were tried with-
out a jury at the time of the Constitution . . . because they were
deemed a species of petty offenses punishable by trivial penalties"
49
"Cases imposing severe sentences include the following: Piemonte v. United
States, 367 U.S. 556 (1961) (eighteen months); Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507
(1960) (two years); Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959) (fifteen months); Green
v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958) (three years); Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385
(1957) (one year and one day); Savin, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 267 (1889) (one year);
Collins v. United States, 269 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1959) (three years); United States v.
Thompson, 214 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 841 (1954) (four
years). See generally Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 384-85 (1966) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 751 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dis-
senting); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 208 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
5 Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in Mr. Justice Black's
dissent. Mr. Justice Brennan dissented in a separate opinion.
,8 356 U.S. at 195 (Black, J., dissenting).
,7 See Tefft, supra note 3, at 123.
8 376 U.S. at 692-700.
,4 376 U.S. at 751-52 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). The exemption from constitutional
jury trial requirements for minor offenses, referred to as the "petty offense exception,"
originated in Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888). There the Court reasoned that
article 3, § 2 of the Constitution was to be "interpreted in the light of the principles
which, at common law, determined whether the accused, in a given class of cases,
was entitled to be tried by a jury." Id. at 549. The Court concluded that "except
in that class or grade of offenses called petty offenses, which according to the common
law, may be proceeded against summarily," the defendant must be afforded trial by
jury. Id. at 557. The distinction, which was supported in its historical foundation
in Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenders and the Constitutional Guaranty
of Trial by Jury, 39 HAv. L. Ray. 917 (1926), was elaborated upon in District of
Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930), and District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S.
617 (1937). However, a recent commentator has issued a strong challenge to the
theory. Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers, 26 U. Cm. L. Rav. 245 (1959). Kaye
contends that the petty offense distinction "reflects an undesirable technique of
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and his observation that the federal courts' historical use of summary
procedures for criminal contempts was generally accompanied by the
imposition of lenient punishments.50 As a necessary concomitant,
moreover, Barnett inferred that where criminal contempts were
punishable by penalties more severe than those imposed for petty
offenses a jury trial was required by article III and the sixth amend-
ment.51
However, the Barnett Court's oblique construction of the inter-
mediate theory merely intensified the controversy as to when a jury
trial is required for criminal contempts. On the one hand, the tradi-
tionalists, assailing Justice Goldberg's reinterpretation of history,
rejected the asserted applicability of the "petty offense equation. '52
On the other hand, others argued that the Court had misapplied the
"equation" by looking solely to the severity of the punishment actu-
ally imposed rather than the maximum permissible punishment.53
Moreover, the indefiniteness of the dictum itself resulted in immedi-
ate juridical conflict as to its precise requisites, particularly as to the
proper line of demarcation for "petty" sentences.5 4
Constitutional interpretation and amounts to an unwarranted abrogation by the
federal government of a Constitutional right," and that the argument supporting it
is supported neither by history nor logic. Id. at 245-46. In addition, the Clawans
case is seen as a "departure from all reason, policy, and precedent." Id. at 277.
50 376 U.S. at 751.
r, "If a criminal contempt (or any other violation of law) is punishable only by a
trivial penalty, then the Constitution does not require trial by jury. If a violation of
law is punishable by a nontrivial penalty, then the Constitution does require trial
by jury whether the violation is labeled criminal contempt or anything else." Id. at
756-57 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
32 See Tefft, supra note 3, at 130-31. The challenge is made primarily against the
contention that the courts are powerless to impose any but trivial penalties for criminal
contempts. Nothing in the constitutional convention debates is seen to indicate that
such a limit is constitutionally imposed. Ex parte Burr, 4 Fed. Cas. 791 (No. 2186)
(C.C.D.C. 1823), in holding the power to summarily punish contempt in the Judiciary
Act of 1789 constitutional, stated that since many of the members of the conven-
tion were members of the first Congress, "it cannot be believed that they would'
have silently acquiesced in so palpable a violation of the then recent constitution .... "
Id. at 797. Judge Learned Hand, in the Second Circuit opinion in Green, stated that
"There is no reason to suppose, because courts had not up to 1914 imposed imprison-
ment for more than a year, that they thought that they had not the power to do so."
United States v. Green, 241 F.2d 631, 634 (1957), aff'd, 356 U.S. 165 (1958). See Gross-
man v. United States, I F.2d 941 (N.D. Ill. 1924), aff'd, 280 Fed. 683 (7th Cir. 1922);
Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 85 (1925) (one-year sentence and a 1,000 dollar fine
held not to conflict with article III and the sixth amendment); In re Gompers, 40
App. Cas. 293 (App. D.C. 1913). Compare Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 49
with Kaye, supra note 49.
53 See Note, 29 ALBANY L. REv. 138, 141-42 (1965); Note, 63 MicH. L. RFv,. 700, 703-
04 (1965).
1 The lower courts, in attempting to apply the Barnelt dictum, drew varying lines
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Against this background of controversy and confusion, Mr.
Justice Clark's directive in Chef adhered to Barnett's intermediate
position that the federal courts must either provide jury trials or
limit sentences to six months imprisonment. 5 However, in con-
of demarcation. In Randazzo v. United States, 339 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1964), where an
eighteen-month sentence was vacated, the court indicated its uncertainty by stating
that "respectful consideration of that dictum calls for the exercise of judgment or dis-
cretion by the district court as to whether to honor the defendant's demand for a jury
trial, or to impose the same or a lesser sentence upon the defendant if he is again
found guilty." Id. at 81. One year later, the same court was still in doubt: "The
Court will undoubtedly assess the effect of the Supreme Court's caveat-dictum in foot-
note 12 of the Barnett case with regard to the imposition of a penalty as severe as
three years imprisonment without a jury trial." Johnson v. United States, 314 F.2d
401, 411 n.21 (5th Cir. 1965). The Second Circuit, in United States v. Bialkin, 331
F.2d 956, 959 (2d Cir. 1964), while avoiding the ultimate issue because the defendant
had pleaded guilty at trial, seemed to approve of the defendant's contention that the
dictum imposed a six-month limit on non-jury sentences. The District of Columbia
Circuit revealed the proposition, perhaps valid even after Cheff, that if local code
provisions are even more restrictive as to the penalty imposable for petty offenses than
the federal code, the local code may be the relevant standard: "Accordingly we think
it proper to instruct the District Court that if on remand it proceeds without a jury, it
can impose no greater imprisonment than ninety days [the maximum sentence without
jury trial in the District of Columbia is ninety days, D.C. CoDE § 11-715a (1961)1."
Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See 63 MicH. L. Ray.
700, 703-04 & n.23 (1965). Without apparent substantiation Tefft constructs the
equation using the six-month figure of 18 U.S.C. § 1 (3) (1964). Tefft, United States v.
Barnett, "Twas a Famous Victory," 1964 Sup. CT. Rnv. 123, 136.
Another controversy resultant from the obscurity of the Barnett dictum was its
potential application to direct contempts. If jury trials were constitutionally compelled
where sentences exceeded those imposed for petty offenses, procedures for all con-
tempts, irrespective of their classification within the direct-indirect dichotomy, would
come within the purview of this mandate. Yet, despite the breadth given the consti-
tutional standard in Barnett, most courts restricted the application of the dictum to
indirect contempts. For example, the Second Circuit, in considering the right to jury
trial, held the dictum inapplicable because "Harris' contempt was committed in the
presence of the court and the contempt proceeding was undertaken prior to compliance
with the court's order, in both of which respects this case differs from Barnett .... 1"
United States v. Harris, 334 F.2d 460, 463 (2d Cir. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 382
U.S. 162 (1965). (Italics added.) See also United States v. Tramunti, 343 F.2d 548,
551-52 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Castaldi, 338 F.2d 883, 885 (2d Cir. 1964), rev'd
on other grounds, 384 U.S. 886 (1966); United States v. Shillitani, 345 F.2d 290, 294
(2d Cir. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
In one case, however, the dictum was followed even though a direct contempt was
involved. In Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1964), the defendant
threw a water pitcher at the prosecutor during the former's robbery trial. The court's
expansive interpretation of the dictum is minimized by the fact that a defense of in-
sanity was being asserted by the defendant during the proceeding, and thus the court
of appeals may have felt that the defendant was entitled to have a jury decide his
responsibility for the act. Id. at 276-77; see 63 MICH. L. REv. 700, 706 n.40 (1965).
"' See note 19 supra and accompanying text. The apparent clarification given the
Barnett "penalty-imposed" criteria by the Cheff "six-months-or-jury-trial" delineation
merely perpetuates the perfunctory assumption of the Barnett court that petty offenses
are distinguished from crimes solely on the basis of the severity of the penalty imposed.
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While Mr. justice Clark's opinion at least intimates a recognition of the standards for
delineation traditionally considered, 384 U.S. at 379-80, and, thus, appears more in-
lightened than the Barnett dictum in which consideration of the severity of the
offense was specifically discounted, see text accompanying note 5 supra, the prevailing
view in Cheff failed to give full effect to factors which might compel classification
of criminal contempts as crimes rather than petty offenses. The criteria for differenti-
ation have never been precisely designated. See Smith v. United States, 128 F.2d 990,
991 (5th Cir. 1§42); Frankfurter & Corcoran, suprd note 49, at 980-82; Kaye, supra note
49, at 271-73; Stewart, The Right to Trial by Jury in Criminal Prosecutions for Petty
Federal Offenses, 39 W. VA. L.Q. 40, 46-47 (1982). The Supreme Court has said,
however, that the distinction between the categories "depends primarily upon the nature
of the offdene." District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930). See, e.g., Natal
v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621, 624 (1891); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1888).
See generally Stewart, supra; Comment, 40 YALE L.J. 1303 (1931). The elucidation of
this classification has utilized several criteria, the application of which to indirect
criminal contempts indicates the arguably serious nature of these offenses. See Cheff
v. Schnackenburg, 384 U.S. 373, 390 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In the first in-
stance, under the early common law, indirect contempts were indictable offenses.
See GOLDnFAi 14-15; Fox, The Nature of Contempt of Court, 37 L.Q. kRy. 191 (1921);
Fox, Ecentricities of the Law of Contempt of COurt, 36 L.Q. Rlv. 394, 396-97 (1920);
Fox, The Summary Process to Punish Contempt, 25 L.Q. Rav. 238, 244-48 (1909); Fox,
The Xing v. Almon (pt. II), 24 L.Q. Rav. 266-70 (1908); Frankfurter & Landis,
supra note 35, at 1(42, 1046. Secondly, since contempt "-wends historically back to
the early days of England and the crown," GowI'At 9, the offense would seem to be
malum in se-or offensive to principles of natural, moral, or public law-rather than mere
malum prohibitum-or unlawful solely because of statutory proscription, Riss & Co. v.
United States, 262 F.2d 245, 248 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1958). Finally, as a consequence of his
conviction, the contemnor may be made to endure certain civil disabilities such as
classification as a convict, Creekmore v. United States, 237 Fed. 743 (8th Cir. 1916),
cert. denied, 242 U.S. 646 (1917), or exclusion from burial in Arlington National
Cemetery, see Cheff v. Schnackenburg, 384 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1966) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting). See also GoLDFAaB 178.
Furthermore, even if the "petty" nature of criminal contempts Wdre posited, Mr.
justice Clark's identification in Cheff of a "petty offense" based solely upon the penalty
imposed is made without regard to the usual constitutional standards. As Mr. justice
Douglas noted, 384 U.S. at 387-91, for purposes of constitutional categorization of
offenses, it is the "maximum potential sentence," not the "penalty actually imposed,"
which has been determinative. See, e.g., Giammario v. Hurney, 311 F.2d 285, 287 (3d
Cir. 1962); Barde v. United States, 224 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1955); Creekmore v. United
States, supra. Yet, if the Cheff directive merely reflects a policy decision, the deviation
from the constitutional standards is immaterial since this type of resolution, while
possibly giving deference to the constitutional criteria, would not be determined by
a singular factor.
That Cheff represents a balancing of competing interests and not a strict adherence
to a specific standard is suggested by the fact that a literal application of the constitu-
tional criterion could result in an unnecessary interference with the effective func-
tioning of the federal courts. Since there is no statutory limitation upon penalties for
most contempts, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 401-02 (1964), application of the "maximum potential
sentence" standard would necessitate jury trials upon every occurrence of this offense.
See Cheff v. Schnackenburg, 384 U.S. 373, 391-93 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Conceivably, the Cheff court may have concluded that adequate protection of an in-
dividual conteminor did not necessitate possibly burdensome jury trials for minor
affronts to the judicial mandate.
Nevertheless, the use of the "penalty-imposed" standard in the Cheff directive seems
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tradistinction to the asserted constitutional mandate for this restric-
tion proffered in Barnett, Mr. Justice Clark relied solely upon the
Supreme Court's policy-making authority over the lower federal
courts. 56 Nevertheless, it is arguable that the Cheff directive may be
constitutionally compelled. Under such an interpretation, the Court's
rejection of a right to a jury trial in the instant case would merely
constitute a reaffirmation of Barnett's constitutional demarcation.57
Mr. Justice Clark's reliance upon nonconstitutional grounds for the
directive might be explained simply as a manifestation of the Court's
traditional hesitation prematurely to render a constitutional de-
cision.58
ultimately a questionable policy decision especially as to indirect contempts since a
judge must decide whether to impanel a jury before any evidence is presented as
to such matters as the precise nature of the contempt and possible mitigating circum-
stances. Thus, an accurate prediction cannot realistically be anticipated. As
formerly argued to the Supreme Court, to endorse this pre-trial prediction is "to dis-
tribute a constitutional right according to blind chance-the defendant whose judge
underestimates the likely sentence will be deprived of a jury; the defendant whose
judge overguesses may be given a jury without being entitled to one." Brief for the
United States, p. 64, Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
5 384 U.S. at 380. See note 62 infra and accompanying text.
"'The Court's intent to accept the constitutional basis of the Barnett dictum
is suggested by several aspects of the Cheff opinion. For example, reference is made
to the Barnett dictum with no indication of disapproval. Also, if Barnett had not
created a constitutional right to trial by jury, the Cheff Court need not have undertaken
its lengthy discussion of whether the petitioner had been denied a right to have his case
considered by a jury; a mere statement as to the nonexistence of such a right would
have provided a sufficient disposition of the petitioner's contention. Moreover, the
Barnett proposition that summary punishment is "constitutionally limited to that pen-
alty provided for petty offenses," 376 U.S. at 695 n.12 (dictum), necessarily implies
-that trial by jury is constitutionally compelled where the sentence exceeds "petty"
punishment. The Cheff Court arguably recognized this concomitant of the Barnett
dictum when it asserted that the petitioner was demanding too broad an interpreta-
tion of the prior case when he contended that on the basis of article III and the sixth
amendment, "the right to jury trial attaches in all criminal contempts and not merely
in those which are outside the category of 'petty offenses." 384 U.S. at 378-79. (Em-
phasis added.) In other words, the analysis of the Cheff Court leaves the inference that
the relevance of the Barnett dictum may have been conceded had the mandate pre-
sented there been argued in accordance with the original demarcation. Finally, the
language of the Court does not contradict a contention that the only result intended
was a rejection of the petitioner's attempt to add breadth to the Barnett holding. It
could also be said that the Court presented the "six-months-sentence" criteria in
order to add specificity to the Barnett delineation and thereby to anticipate similar
arguments by future petitioners.
68 See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503 (1961); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S.
207, 211-12 (1960); United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 590-93 (1957); Rice v. Sioux
City Mem. Park Cemetery Inc., 349 U.S. 70, 74 (1955); United States v. Hayman, 342
U.S. 205, 223 (1952); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 (1947).
Vol. 1967: 632]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
On the other hand, the aforesaid rationalization for the directive's
policy foundation seems tenuous, at best, for little justification exists
for any reluctance to reach the constitutional question in light of
Barnett's previous assertion of a constitutional interpretation. More-
over, the directive itself would thereby be rendered superfluous, for
the discretionary power supporting it would have been exercised un-
necessarily. Finally, the prevailing opinion appeared simply to em-
ploy the "petty offense equation" as an analogy for analytic pur-
poses. That is to say, criminal contempts were viewed as only
"equivalent to" petty offenses59 and their sui generis nature was
re-emphasized.60 The more persuasive interpretation, therefore,
would seem to be that Mr. Justice Clark has obliquely withdrawn
the constitutional basis of the Barnett-Cheff restriction. 1
However, the prevailing opinion's sole reliance upon the Court's
revisory and supervisory powers as support for its restriction poses
serious questions as to the judiciousness and potential effectiveness
of the Cheff directive. Although the bases and scope of these powers
are obscure,62 nevertheless it is well established that the Court's dis-
Barnett, Avoidance of Judicial Decision upon Constitutional Ground When Decision
Can Be Based upon Other Grounds, 28 ORE. L. RFv. 201 (1949); Note, 48 COLUM. L.
REv. 427 (1948).
A technique recently adopted by the Court has involved justifying its resolution
of issues as an exercise of its supervisory power and subsequently supporting its con-
clusion with a constitutional basis. Compare Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 810
(1959), with Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). See also Thiel v. Southern
Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946); Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1966), 1967
DuKE L.J. 346.
19 "[V~e are constrained to view the proceedings here as equivalent to a procedure
to prosecute a petty offense . 8. " 384 U.S. at 379. "Cheff's offense can be treated only
as 'petty' in the eyes of the statute [18 U.S.C. § I (1964)-see note 18 supra] and our
prior decisions." 384 U.S. at 380.
"°Ibid. But see note 55 supra. Mr. Justice Clark's characterization of con-
tempt as sui generis is important in light of the fact that the label had played a par-
ticular role in the historical development of contempt. See note 24 supra.
61 Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in Cheff, also interpreted the prevailing opinion
as relying solely upon the Court's discretionary powers. 384 U.S. at 381.
62 The supervisory power was first enunciated as a basis of decision in McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943): "Judicial supervision of the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining
civilized standards of procedure and evidence." While the Supreme Court did not
elaborate the precise source of this power, it appears to be neither constitutionally
based, since it was specifically employed in McNabb as an independent basis of decision,
id. at 341, nor related to specific statutory authorization. See Comment, 53 GEO. L.J.
1050, 1062-65 (1965). Although its rudiments vaguely parallel the rule-making authority
of English common law courts, see id. at 1053-56, the genesis of the power is probably
an inherent attribute of the Supreme Court's position as the pinnacle of the federal
court system. See Note, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1656 (1963). Initially announced as a
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discretionary power over the functioning of federal criminal jurisdiction, the super-
visory power has subsequently been exercised to affect procedures in both administra-
tive proceedings and civil litigation. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activi-
ties Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115 (1956); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
In utilizing the supervisory power to maintain "civilized standards," the Supreme
Court has increasingly imposed upon the federal courts procedures more exacting than
the minimum requirements of due process. For example, a petitioner seeking reversal
of a state court judgment rendered on the basis of perjured testimony must make an
affirmative showing of prejudice. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
Reversals have been granted to appellants from federal courts, however, when only
a substantial allegation of perjury was made. See Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., supra. But see Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S.
341 (1963). Thus, impetus for an exercise of the power often appears to arise more
from a conclusion as to the lack of fairness in a proceeding than a concern for the
detriment to a particular litigant. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., supra (petitioner
not required to show membership in a class unjustly excluded from jury service).
Compare Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946), with Moore v. New York, 333
U.S. 565 (1948). See also Note, 76 HAiv. L, REv. 1656, 1659 (1963). The procedures
subject to this protean power are apparently without limit absent evidence of contrary
congressional intent. See id. at 1656. Thus, in light of the scope of possible applica-
.tions, categorization of decisions rendered pursuant to this power is of slight sig-
nificance. See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); Grunewald v.
United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956). See
generally Comment, 53 GEo. L.J. 1050, 1056-78 (1965).
Because few congressional enactments have specified maximum penalties for crim-
inal contempts, the revisory power exists to prevent abuses in the exercise of sentencing
discretion. Such a power is unique to contempt procedures, for in the usual criminal
case, a statutorily prescribed range of sanctions has been held to justify disallowance
of appellate court revision of sentences initally imposed. See, e.g., United States v.
Pruitt, 341 F.2d 700, 703 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1965). Balancing the utility of an un-
constrained contempt power in ensuring efficient judicial administration against the
dangers inherent in unlimited sentencing discretion, the Supreme Court has avoided
"artificial limitations on the power" and has instead vested in "appellate courts .. .
a special responsibility for determining that the power is not abused, to be exercised
if necessary by revising themselves the sentences imposed." Green v. United States,
356 U.S. 165, 188 (1958). See also Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959); Yates
v. United States, 356 U.S. 363 (1958); Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957);
United States v. UMWA, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); United States v. Harris, 367 F.2d 826
(2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Levine, 288 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1961). Moreover, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in the recent case of Schnurman v.
United States, No. 20411, April 7, 1967, at 2, has asserted a statutory prescription for
the revisory power in 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1964): any "court of appellate jurisdiction may
affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court
-lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry
of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to
be had as may be just under the circumstances."
In evaluating the fairness of an exercise of the prodigious sentencing power, an
appellate court should consider (1) the flagrance of the contempt, Green v. United
States, supra at 188; (2) the impartiality and adequacy of the hearing at which the
sentence was imposed, Brown v. United States, supra at 52; (3) indicia of congressional
intent to limit the sanction, as where a statutory maximum sentence is established for
the activity subsequent to the occurrence of the contempt or where limitations have
been enacted for similar offenses, see id. at 52 n.15; Green v. United States, supra at
189; (4) in cases involving multiple contemnors, the consistency of the sanctions im-
posed, see ibid. Thus, while the supervisory power is often exercised to establish
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cretionary power cannot be employed in contravention of either valid
federal statutes or clear legislative intent.63 However, in contrast to
previous instances in which the Court has utilized its policy-making
authority to accord extra-statutory procedural safeguards, both the
right to trial by jury and the permissible length of sentences for
criminal contempt have been the subject of continued congressional
scrutiny. In the instant case, Mr. Justice Clark's two-pronged direc-
tive that in all prosecutions for criminal contempt the federal courts
must either limit sentences to six months imprisonment or accord
jury trials is, therefore, conceivably disruptive of Congress' con-
sidered regulatory scheme for indirect contempt proceedings. 4
For analytical purposes, indirect contempts arguably are divisible
into three categories with respect to the appropriateness of jury
trials. In the first instance, Congress has conferred a statutory right
to trial by jury in three limited situations where protection of a
particular class of contemnors was deemed to outweigh considera-
tions of judicial efficiency.6 5 However, where the latter element was
precedential procedural standards, the revisory power usually leads to determinations
irrevocably based in the particular circumstances considered.
0"Our general power to supervise the administration of justice in the federal
courts . . . does not extend to disregarding a validly enacted and applicable statute or
permitting departure from it, even in such matters as venue." United States v.
National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573, 589 (1948). In the decision initially employing
the supervisory power, the Court stated: "[In reaching our conclusion] ...we respect
the policy which underlies Congressional legislation." McNabb v. United States, supra
note 62, at 347. Cf. Griffin v. United States, 336 U.S. 704, 717-48 (1949).
0, In addition to the uncertainty generated with regard to indirect contempts, the
directive failed to resolve the pre-existing conflict as to the applicability of the petty
offense equation to direct contempts. See note 54 supra. While the precise issue in
Cheff concerned only indirect contempts, Mr. Justice Clark failed to differentiate be-
tween "direct" and "indirect" contempt despite the confusion over the applicability
of the Barnett dictum. Arguably, therefore, the directive encompasses "direct" as well
as "indirect" contempts. Nevertheless, several factors militate against such a construc-
tion. When breaches of courtroom decorum occur within the presence of the court
itself, summary disposition seems essential to prevent delays in the judicial process and
to preserve the integrity and efficiency of the judicial system. Weighed against the
demands of judicial efficiency, the existing procedural requirements for direct contempts
would seem adequately to protect the criminal contemnor. See FED. R. CRuss. P. 42;
Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965); 1966 DuKE LJ. 814, 819-20. Nor is the
trend toward harsher sentences which precipitated the Barnett and Cheff restrictions
duplicated in the case of direct contempts. Finally, in the same term in which Cheff was
decided the Supreme Court upheld the use of summary proceedings in a "narrow cate-
gory" of contumacious conduct which poses "an open, serious threat to orderly pro.
cddure" Inaking "necessary" immediate action to preserve the efficacy of the court
itself. Harris v. United States, supra at 164-65. It would therefore seem improbable
that the Court would promptly overrule itself and, moreover, do so sub silentio.
Or See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text. In granting a jury trial where the
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considered predominant, legislative history clearly evidences Con-
gress' intent that a trial by jury should not be afforded. For ex-
ample, all contempts before certain administrative and quasi-judicial
officials are required by statute to be punished "in a summary man-
ner." 66  Congress has also expressly precluded jury trials in all
contempt proceedings arising out of cases to which the United States
is a party, primarily on the theory that juries might undermine the
effective enforcement of such regulatory statutes as the Sherman Act
and the Interstate Commerce Act.67  Similarly, Congress has em-
contemptuous act also constitutes a crime, the purpose seems to have been to assure
a jury trial to defendants who, in" defying court orders, also engaged in conduct labeled
by the legislature as criminal. Before the act it was possible to enjoin the commission
of crimes and, by the use of the contempt power, to "short-circuit" the criminal law.
See Tailiaferro v. United States, 290 Fed. 906, 910-11 (4th Cir. 1923); H.R. REP. No.
627, 6d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1914); H.R. REP. No. 613, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at
6 (1912); 48 CONG. REc. 8779 (1912) (remarks of Representative Clayton); Cf. GOLIFARB
183.
Dissatisfaction with the operation of the Clayton Act and the anti-union bias of
the judiciary prompted passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act designed to remedy only
those abuses arising out of injunctions in labor disputes. See note 36 supra; SWAYZEE,
CONTEMPT OF COURT IN LABOR INJUNCTION CAsEs 106-08 (1935); THOMAS, op. cit. supra
note 42, at 42-45; Chamberlain, The Federal Anti-injunction Act, 18 A.BA.J. 477
(1932); Frankfurter & Greene, Congressional Power over the Labor Injunctions, 31
COLuM. L. Rav. 385 (1931).
The jury trial provisions in the Civil Rights Act, supra note 37, were the result of
various compromises in Congress. It was primarily the southern members who ad-
vocated absolute jury trial provisions in order to protect public officials. This
position, and even the compromise that was reached, created difficulties for civil rights
proponents who saw that the grant or requirement of jury trials could be used by
southern federal district judges as a face-saving device; these judges could heed a
Department of Justice request for enforcement by issuing a criminal contempt cita-
tion, but ultimately defer to segregationist sentiment by granting a jury trial. The
1964 provision was also influenced by the Barnett dictum, which was handed down
in the midst of the debate, and the important role of the jury trial issue in the southern
filibuster. See Goldfarb & Kruzman, supra note 42, at 496-506.
"6 See National Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § 41, 30 Stat. 556 (1898), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 69 (1964) (contempts committed before a bankruptcy referee, upon certifica-
tion to the judge of the bankruptcy court, shall be punished "in a summary manner");
5 U.S.C.A. § 8125 (1966) (Special Pamphlet), formerly Government Employee's Com-
pensation Act, ch. 458, § 23, 39 Stat. 747 (1916) (similar procedure for contempts before
the Secretary of Labor or his representative); Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Act,
ch. 509, § 23, 44 Stat. 1438 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 927 (1964) (same).
'7 18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 3691 (1964) (see note 35 supra). See 51 CONG. REc. 14377 (1914)
(remarks of Senator Walsh); id. at 14413, 14417 (remarks of Senator Borah). See gen-
erally Brief for the United States, pp. 40-44, United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681
(1964). "The reasons which influenced Congress are apparent. Where the United
States is proceeding to enforce a public right, the defendant is afforded the safeguard
of an independent and impartial determination by public officials before the proceeding
is instituted-a safeguard not available in private litigation. In that situation, it was
thought, the United States should have the full range of sanctions for vindicating
judicial orders unmitigated by a jury's powers of dispensation." Id. at 40. See 48
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phasized that jury trials are not to be provided for contempts of the
courts of appeals since a substantial administrative burden would
thereby be imposed due to the absence of existing jury machinery.,,
Nor has Congress by its silence conferred unbridled discretion upon
the federal courts with respect to the residuum. By providing that all
contempts outside of the specified categories are to be tried "in
conformity to the prevailing usages at law," which traditionally have
excluded jury trials, Congress evinced a considered judgment that
the efficacious administration of the judicial process requires the
maintenance of summary contempt procedures. 9 In addition, on
GONG. REc. 8779, 8785 (1912) (remarks of Representative Clayton); id. at 8780 (re-
marks of Representative Ford); id. app. at 314 (speech of Representative Davis); 51
CoNG. REc. 14377 (1914) (remarks of Senator Walsh).
Furthermore, the legislative history of the Sherman Act and the Interstate Com-
merce Act evinces an intent to anticipate possible frustrations to fulfillment of the
policies motivating those enactments. It was apparently believed that lay juries might
be either hostile to or ignorant of the purposes of the acts. Thus, to foster the
uniform development of the legislative mandates where the Government could affect
the results of litigation, the burden of formulating rights and remedies was placed
solely upon governmental agencies and the federal judiciary with an implied belief
that these instrumentalities would more likely comprehend the goals undertaken by
the two statutes. See 48 CoNG. RF.. 8776-809 (1912) (debate on procedure in con-
tempt cases); id. app. at 313-19 (speech of Representative Davis); cf. Comment, 65 YAIX
L.J. 846, 859 n.74 (1956).
"SCongressional recognition of the pragmatic limitation upon jury trials at the
appellate level is evident from the legislative history of the jury trial provision in
the Clayton Act. The first attempt to provide jury trial in antitrust contempt cases
was not limited to trial courts and was opposed on the grounds that it established jury
procedures "in courts where there were no jurors." 48 CoNG. RE c. 8778 (1912) (re.
marks of Representative Clayton). A second proposal eliminated this objectionable
feature, so that the bill was then "limited to proceedings in the district courts . . .
which courts have proper machinery for juries." Id. at 8780 (remarks of Representa-
tive Ford). See H.R. 22591, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912); 48 CONG. REC. 8778 (1912)
(remarks of Representative Clayton); id. app. at 314 (speech of Representative Davis);
51 CoNc. REc. 14374 (1914) (remarks of Senator Chilton); id. at 14414 (remarks of
Senator Jones). While this bill failed to pass because of adjournment, an identical
provision, H.R. 15657, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914), was successful the following term.
See S. REP. No. 968, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 33-42 (1914).
"Nor can it be supposed that the drafters of the Clayton Act ignored the possi-
bility of contempt of appellate court orders. Section 11 [of the Clayton Act] . . .
expressly referred to the circuit courts of appeals in conferring power upon them
to enforce orders of [certain specified administrative agencies] . . . and it must have
been contemplated that disobedience of the enforcement decree might give rise to
contempt.
"The plain fact is that the jury trial provision was intentionally restricted to
district court proceedings. Then, as now, Congress well knew how to provide for
all courts." Brief for United States, pp. 28-29, United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S.
681 (1964). See generally id. at 22-32.
"18 U.S.C. §§402, 3691 (1964), which confer a statutory right to a trial by jury
whenever the contempt also constitutes a separate crime or arises out of a labor dis-
pute, pointedly declare that "all cases of contempts not specifically embraced in this
[Vol. 1967: 632
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at least three occasions, Congress has refused to enact legislation
which would have substantially broadened the existing statutory jury
trial provisions.7 0 Similarly, while the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure were recently amended, no expansion of the jury trial
procedures was undertaken despite increasing demand for legisla-
tive or judicial action.7 1 At best, therefore, this history of con-
gressional inaction arguably suggests a legislative design that jury
trials for criminal contempts be employed sparingly in the federal
courts.
In contrast, Mr. Justice Clark acknowledged no exceptions to
the jury-trial prong of the directive: where "non-petty" sentences are
to be imposed, a trial by jury must be provided.7 2 Under the Barnett
rationale any consequent conflict between the Court's pronounce-
ment and existing statutes and congressional policy was irrelevant
since by necessity the inconsistent legislative intent would be un-
constitutional. However, resulting as it does from a mere judicial
section may be punished in conformity to the prevailing usages at law." The legis-
lative history of both sections dearly indicates that the "prevailing usages" dauses
were incorporated principally to ensure the preservation of the federal courts' his-
lorical power to punish criminal contemnors without according a trial by jury. See,
e.g., S. REP. No. 827, 54th Cong., Ist Sess. (1896); 28 CONG. REc. 6320-21 (1896) (re-
marks of Senator Hill); 48 CONG. REc. 8778 (1912) (remarks of Representative Clayton);
51 CONG. REc. 14414 (1914) (remarks of Senator Jones), cf. note 80 infra and accom-
panying text.
70In the formulation of the Clayton Act, Senator Borah proposed an amendment,
later defeated, which would have provided, in his words, "for jury trials in contempt
cases in actions brought by the government the same as when actions are brought
by private individuals." 51 CONG. REc. 14413, 14417 (1914). Eighteen years later
the Senate version of Norris-LaGuardia anti-injunction proposal included jury trials
"in all cases in which a person shall be charged with contempt in a court of the United
States .... 75 CONG. REc. 4757 (1932) (remarks of Senator Norris). After confer-
ence, the guarantee of a jury trial was restricted to contempts arising under the spe-
cific legislation considered by the conference committee. See H.R. REP. No. 821,
72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 75 CONG. REc. 6336 (1932); 75 CONG. REC.
6450 (1932) (remarks of Senator Norris). Finally, an amendment of Senator Talmadge
in the 1964 Civil Rights Act sought to provide a trial by jury in all criminal contempt
cases in the federal courts, under the Civil Rights Bill or any other act of Congress.
Amendment No. 513, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reported in 110 CONG. REC. 8649-50
(1964). However, the provision became embroiled in the tactics of cloture to cut off
the southern filibuster and was itself amended to provide jury trials only under the
Civil Rights Act Amendment No. 869 (1964), reported in 110 CoNG. REc. 12843, 13050-
51 (1964). See 110 CONG. REc. 12843-54, 12859-62, 12949-96 (1964) (debate on Civil
Rights Act); Goldfarb & Kurzman, supra note 42, at 496-506.
71 The amended rules were transmitted to Congress on February 28, 1966, and took
effect on July 1, 1966. No change occurred in rule 42, see 86 Sup. Ct. 212-30 (1966),
despite suggestions for alteration. See, e.g., Comment, 65 YALEx L.J. 846, 859 & n.74
(1960); cf. GOLDFARB 282-83, 300-01.
72 See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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policy decision, the contrariety arguably produced by the instant
case seemingly occasions an unavoidable dilemma for the Court. To
comport with the traditional limitations upon the Supreme Court's
discretionary powers, 73 the jury-trial alternative must be deemed in-
operative, at least where Congress has laid down an explicit pro-
cedure which precludes the accordance of jury trials. 74 On the other
hand, full implementation of the directive's prescription would
necessitate not only the substantial expansion of the Court's policy-
making powers but also a concomitant recognition of the Supreme
Court's power to contravene congressional intent on other than con-
stitutional grounds. In light of the improbability of the latter
alternative,75 the viability of the "right" to trial by jury originally
tendered in Barnett would seem to have been at least somewhat
emasculated by Mr. Justice Clark's retreat from its previous consti-
tutional foundation.
The sentence-limitation prong of Mr. Justice Clark's directive
similarly may be inconsistent with Congress' regulatory scheme for
indirect contempts. Congress has statutorily prescribed the maxi-
mum sentence only where the contemptuous act also constitutes a
separate crime,76 arises under certain civil rights statutes, 77 or occurs
before a military tribunal.78 With respect to all other contempts,
Congress has expressly authorized the federal courts to -punish con-
temnors "in conformity to the prevailing usages at law"79 under
73 See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
7' See notes 66-71 supra and accompanying text.
' See note 101 infra and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. § 402 (1964) (originally enacted as Clayton Act §§ 21-22, 24, 38 Stat.
738 (1914)).
7 Civil Rights Act of 1957, § 151, 71 Stat. 638, 42 U.S.C. § 1995 (1964); Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 1101, 78 Stat. 268, 42 U.S.C. §2000h (1964). See note 37 supra.
" 10 U.S.C. § 848 (1964) (originally enacted as Uniform Code of Military Justice
art. 48, 64 Stat. 123 (1950)).
1918 U.S.C. § 402 (1964). The courts have always possessed wide discretion in
imposing contempt sentences. The Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 17 (a), 1 Stat. 83,
authorized the courts to "punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of such
courts, all contempts ... before the same." The abuse of this undefined power by
Judge James H. Peck resulted in the passage of the Act of March 2, 1831, 4 Stat. 487(1856), which, while limiting contempts to those acts presently enumerated in 18
U.S.C. §401 (1964), made no change in sentencing discretion. See generally Frank-
furter 8= Landis, supra note 35, at 1023-28. Similarly, the present statutory authoriza-
tion merely provides that "a court of the United States shall have power to punish
by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none
other, as- (1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice; (2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their
official transactions; (3) Disobedience of resistance to its lawful writ, process, order,
rule, decree, or command." 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1964).
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which sentences are reviewable only for abuse of discretion.80  An
implied endorsement of the court's relatively unconstrained sen-
tencing discretion in this residuum may also be inferrable from
Congress' increasing reliance upon the flexibility of the judicial
contempt power as the primary means of enforcing administrative
rulings. 81  Since the regulatory mandate of many agencies encom-
80 See note 62 supra. The legislative history of the "prevailing usages" clause, cf.
notes 65, 67-70 supra, clearly indicates that its purpose was to ensure that con-
tempts other than those explicitly governed by the statutes were to be tried according
to preexisting procedures. See H. REP. No. 613, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912). See
generally Brief for United States, pp. 47-53, United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681
(1964). Prior to the enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914, and its re-enactment in
1948, it was well established in both English and American law that the only limitation
upon the courts' sentencing power for criminal contempts was that imposed by sound
discretion. See, e.g., UMWA v. United States, 330 U.S. 258, 304-05 (1947); United
States ex rel. Brown v. Lederer, 140 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S.
734 (1944); Warring v. Huff, 122 F.2d 641, 642 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
678 (1941); Creekmore v. United States, 237 Fed. 743, 754-55 (8th Cir. 1916), cert.
denied, 242 U.S. 646 (1917); In re Maury, 205 Fed. 626, 632 (9th Cir. 1913); Carter
v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 791, 811 (1899). See generally THoMAs, op. cit. supra note
42, at 10; Note, Civil and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 57 YALE L.J.
83, 99 (1947). Therefore, Congress' specific incorporation of sentencing discretion
would seem to evince Congress' considered judgment that on balance both the adequate
protection of contemnors and judicial efficiency were best served by preserving the
courts' discretion in all but narrow circumstances. Cf. note 83 infra and accom-
panying text. See generally Brief for United States, pp. 39-60, United States v.
Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
81 See Jaffe, supra note 43, at 907, 914; cf. id. at 871. Numerous provisions authorize
judicial enforcement of administrative rulings through the contempt power. See
statutes cited note 43 supra. While flexibility of remedy probably influenced the
choice of the contempt power for enforcement, a major consideration was to insure
judicial review of administrative action. See Jaffe, supra note 43 at 865-67; cf. Note, 1966
DuKE L.J. 841, 843 n.16. An agency order once issued is reviewable judicially in a
court of appeals. If the legal and factual basis of the order is sustained, the court
enforces the order by judicial decree. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act § 11 (2),
61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 161 (2) (1964). Violations of agency orders do not
ordinarily become subject to the contempt power until such review has taken place.
See Jaffe, supra note 43, at 869.
The criticisms directed against summary contempt procedures would seem in-
applicable to enforcement order proceedings, for the enforcement order is usually
proceeded by a long legal proceeding in which facts and specific issues have been
determined. See Comment, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 607-10 (1954). Thus, those
accused have been able to refine, in both administrative and judicial actions, the legal
and factual issues underlying the duty imposed. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n Act
§ 5 (c), 52 Stat. 112 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1945). See generally Jaffe,
The Right to Judicial Review (pts. 1-2), 71 HARV. L. REv. 401, 769 (1958). "They
[the defendants] have been personally ordered to conduct themselves in a specific man-
ner, and have had the opportunity-before being placed under a legal obligation to
obey-to test the legal sufficiency of the order which imposes the legal duty upon
them." Brief for the United States, pp. 16-17, Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373
(1966). See generally id. at 11-19. Because of the safeguards which have been afforded
to the contemnor in this instance, including a clear delineation of his obligations,
limitation of sentence to six months, regardless of the flagrance involved, is un-
necessary and arguably undesirable.
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passes a gamut of possible violations, adjustment of the penalty to the
violation could be best achieved by the incorporation of the protean
sanctions of the contempt power. More significantly, however, the
continued absence of further statutory regulation appears to mani-
fest a congressional acceptance of the historical postulate that, in
general, sentencing discretion is indispensable to the proper func-
tioning of the judicial system.8  In the first instance, the unique
nature of the three specific classes of contemnors for whom maximum
sentences have been statutorily provided would seem to indicate that
Congress will divest the courts of their traditional discretion over
contempt sentences only under the most compelling circumstances,
such as when the possibility of prejudicial abuse of discretion is
particularly significant.8 3 Furthermore, the federal scheme has been
maintained despite its variance from state procedure under which, by
contrast, comprehensive statutory delineation of maximum sentences
for all categories of contempt is the norm.8
82 See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
8 3 In the case of a contemptuous act which also constitutes a crime, the same logic
that compels a jury trial seemingly applies to deny complete sentencing discretion:
the court might impose a sentence for the contempt which exceeds the statutory maxi.
mum for the crime. See note 65 supra. Further, although the reasoning behind limita-
tion upon judicial discretion in contempts under the Civil Rights Act is clouded by the
act's congressional history, ibid., the intent seems to have been to protect civil rights
violators from severe sentences. Finally, the limitation of contempt sentences in military
tribunals flows from a general congressional desire to afford some protection to the
military defendant to compensate for dangers inherent in lower level court martials
where the defendant is without counsel to advise him with respect to the consequences
of his courtroom actions and is tried by officers without a jury. See 59 CONG. REC.
5836-43 (1920) (Articles of War amendment offered by Senator Chamberlain); id. at
5843-45 (remarks of Senator Chamberlain).
81 The statutes of twenty-six states limit the maximum punishment which may be
imposed for contempt to six months or less. ALA. CODE tit. 3, § 9 (1958) (supreme
court: ten days; circuit courts: five days; other courts: six to twenty-four hours);
ALAsKA STAT. § 09.50.020 (1962) (six months); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-902 (1947) (ten
days or until adjournment of court); CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 1218 (five days); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-119, 51-33 (1949) (six months); HAwAII REV. LAWS § 269-1
(1955) (trial by jury: two years; summary punishment by supreme court: sixty days;
by circuit court: thirty days; by other courts: ten days); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-610
(1948) (five days); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-906 (1946) (three months); IOWA CODE §665.4
(1962) (six months); KY. REv. STAT. §432.260 (1960) (maximum without jury trial:
thirty days); LA. REv. STAT. § 15:11 (1950) (ten days); MICH. STAT. ANN. §27A.1715
(1962) (thirty days); MINN. STAT. ANN. §588.10 (1947) (six months); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 1656 (1956) (thirty days); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9810 (1964) (five days); NEV.
REV. STAT. §22.100 (1957) (conflicting-twenty-five days); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW §751
(thirty days); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5-4 (1953) (thirty days); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-62
(1960) (thirty days); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2705.05 (Page 1954) (ten days); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 33.020 (1965) (six months); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-903 (1955) (circuit, chancery,
and appellate courts: ten days; others: fine only); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 1736,
1826, 1911, 1955 (1964) (supreme court and court of civil appeals: twventy days; district
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Mr. Justice Clark's recognition of a continuing necessity for
sentencing discretion over contempts seems implicit in the alterna-
tive provided by the Cheft directive. Since the six months maximum
prescribed by the sentence-limitation prong is inapplicable where a
jury trial is provided, the directive theoretically perpetuates the
courts' relatively unfettered power to punish criminal contemnors.
However, the effective implementation of this discretion arguably
would seem to have been impaired by the prevailing opinions'
imposition of the potentially burdensome precondition that a jury
trial must be provided, 5 for there would appear to be innumerable
instances in which the jury-trial alternative would be either un-
available due to statutory proscription8 6 or impracticable in light
and county courts: three days); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-32-10 (1958) (thirty days; justice
of the peace: one day); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.20.020 (1956) (six months); Wis. STAT.
§ 256.06 (1963) (thirty days).
In eighteen states, however, either no limitation is placed on contempt sentences or
the limitation is in excess of six months. DE.L. Su'mt. Or. (CQum.) R. 42 (1953) (similar
to FED. R.. Cum. P. 42, note 31 supra); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 38.22 (1944) (only limitation
on justice of the peace); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-105 (1959); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 1-7 (1961)
(limits an undefined sentence to one year), People v. Stellar, 31 Ill. 2d 154, 201 N.E.2d
97, cert. denied, 380 U.S. 912 (1964) (statute inapplicable to contempt of court); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-1204, 21-111 (1964) (limit upon undefined sentence: one year);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 252 (1965); MD. ANN. CoDa art. 26, § 4 (1957); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 476.120 (1952); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-2122, -2123 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:85-7 (1952) (criminal contempt is a misdemeanor. State v. Janiec, 25 N.J. Super.
197, 95 A.2d 762 (Super. Ct. 1953); when no punishment is fixed, the maximum is
three years); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-1-2 (1953), 36-16-2 (Supp. 1964) (only limitation-
justice of the peace: three days); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 8-6-1 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 10-1738, 15-231.1 (1962); S.D. COD §§ 13.1235, .0607 (1939), 38.3703 (Supp. 1960)
(guilty of misdemeanor-maximum one year; Justice Court limited to one day); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 123 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-292, -293 (1960) (courts not
of record limited to ten days); W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 61-5-26 (1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-669 (1957) (justice of peace: two days).
Only three states require a jury trial upon the demand of the defendant. Am.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-863 (1956) (maximum penalty is still six months); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 567 (Supp. 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2047 (c) (1962).
The laws of three states do not contain any general contempt provisions. Rather,
various specific acts are considered to be contempts. E.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-
11-9, 139-84-11, 139-85-11 (1963) (right to jury trial in cases involving labor disputes;
police courts: maximum sentence is five days); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 220, § 13A (1955)
(right to jury trial in cases involving labor disputes); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 544.16,
.17, .40 (1955) (violation of injunction against a continuing nuisance: six months maxi-
mum).
s" On the other hand, many foreign jurisdictions severely constrict the permissible
punishment for criminal contempt. See, e.g., Bigelow, Contempt of Court, 1 CaIm.
L.Q. 475 (1959) (in Canada maximum punishment for failure to obey process is 100
dollars and ninety days; maximum punishment for refusal to obey court orders is eight
days); Jann, Contempt of Court in Western Germany, 8 AMER. U.L. REv. 34 (1959)
(maximum one day imprisonment in Western Germany for direct contempts).
86 See notes 66-70 supra and accompanying text.
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of the attendant expense, delay, inconvenience, or unavailability of
jury trial machinery.8 7 Under these circumstances a court could
impose no more than a six months sentence, regardless of the egregi-
ousness of the contempt, arguably thereby severely constricting, in
apparent contradiction of congressional policy, a trial court's ability
to determine appropriate sentences for contempts on an ad hoc
basis. Finally, since jury trials for disobedience of courts of appeals'
orders enforcing administrative determinations would seem to be
either unavailable or impracticable, 8 the directive would also seem
to undermine congressional reliance upon the contempt device as the
basic enforcement mechanism for administrative agencies.89 The
sentence-limitation prong of the directive, therefore, conceivably
confronts the Court with a dilemma similar to that generated by the
jury-trial alternative: either the traditional limitations upon the
7 A mandatory jury trial seems most burdensome when hte contemnor's refusal
to comply is based solely on legal grounds. In such a case, the function of a jury is
unclear, for the primary issue-whether a sufficient legal justification exists for non-
compliance-is not within the competence of a fact finder. Resolution of the factual
issue of whether there was actual noncompliance appears to be so elemental as to
render formalistic and economically unjustifiable any empaneling of a jury. Unneces-
sary delays may occur in otlier situations as well. For example, resolution of the facts
of many contempts is often necessary before final adjudication can be made of the
case in which the contempt occurred. In many proceedings, it would be necessary
to ascertain immediately whether a juror was bribed or a party was improperly in-
fluenced to move for dismissal of an action. See Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 846, 855-56
(1956). In order to avoid protraction of the principal proceeding, an immediate in-
vestigation by the judge would in many cases seem preferable to a compulsory
empaneling of another jury, or, where the original jury is retained, a stay in the
underlying proceeding. Also, some facts of the principal case, such as whether par-
ticular records actually existed, might be relevant to the prosecution of the con-
temptuous activity. Resubmission of evidence and arguments on these mattters seem
to be an unnecessary duplicity.
It has been argued that, in many situations, summary punishment by the court is
necessary to preserve a quick and efficient response to refusals to observe judicial
mandates. See id. at 855-57. This analysis apparently presumes that the deterrent
effect of contempt proceedings would be diminished if prosecution were left to the
discretion of a district attorney rather than with the individual judge who could en-
force immediate sanctions. But see GOLDFARB 182.
68 Presently, no well established procedures exist for empaneling of juries in courts
of appeals. If this deficiency forecloses the jury-trial alternative of the Cheff directive,
sentencing for criminal contempts in these courts would appear limited by the six-
month maximum prescribed by the Supreme Court. As an alternative to limiting
sentences in this manner, these intermediate courts could refer prosecutions to the
district courts, even though the statutory basis for such referral and the precise method
of presentation of such a case remain undefined. Further, an examination of the
precedents cited in note 44 supra reveals that a six-month limitation on sentences for
refusals to obey enforcement orders would substantially alter the current view of
enforcement discretion.
5 See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court's discretionary rule-making authority must be dis-
avowed or the directive must be reformulated, if not revoked, so as
to avoid disruption of Congress' regulatory scheme. 0
While most of the aforementioned conflicts between the directive
and congressional policy might be avoided through a more limited
interpretation of legislative history,91 Mr. Justice Clark apparently
considered legislative intent immaterial despite respondent's argu-
ments to the contrary.9 2 However, in light of the potential conflicts
created, this disregard of congressional intent by the Court would
seem to be highly improvident, particularly in light of the Court's
failure to articulate countervailing policy considerations.
Moreover, positing a conflict between the directive and con-
gressional policy, the Court's reliance upon non-constitutional
grounds to support a unilateral alteration of Congress' regulatory
scheme may also unnecessarily engender a separation of powers
90 See notes 73-76 supra and accompanying text.
91Other possible interpretations of the congressional intent evinced by statutory
limitations on jury trials and sentencing discretion are not necessarily inconsistent with
the Cheff directive. More specifically, it is arguable that the restrictions upon the
availability of jury trials were intended not to prohibit such procedures generally, but
rather merely to remove a demandable right to them. See notes 66-69 supra and
accompanying text. In order to fulfill the purposes of the Clayton Act, for example,
Congress conceivably sought to avoid allowing the contemnor to take advantage of any
popular feeling against organized labor except in cases where the judiciary deemed
the need for the safeguards of a jury trial to outweigh the consequences of a possible
frustration of the act's objectives. Thus, the grant of jury trals for a general class of
contempts under the Cheff directive, as an exercise of judicial discretion to preserve
procedural fairness, could not be said to be contrary to this type of legislative intent.
Similarly, it is arguable that the limitations upon sentences for some contempts
(see notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text) reflect a general dissatisfaction with
the discretion of courts to sentence contempts without regard to the traditional rights
of the defendant. Again, the directive comports with the objective of these con-
gressional limitations, for the protection of jury procedures is afforded to all who are
to receive "non-petty" sanctions.
The issue of congressional intent would, of course, be irrelevant had the Cheff
directive been constitutionally based. See notes 56-60 supra and accompanying text.
Also, the significance of any conflict between the directive and statutory objectives
could have been diminished by an amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, for the enactment granting the Supreme Court authority to promulgate
those rules provides that all conflicting laws will be superseded. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771
(1964); note 113 infra and accompanying text.
9-°While the. Brief for the United States in Cheff contained little discussion of
legislative history, it expressly incorporated the United States' Briefs in Green and
Barnett, both of which contained lengthy discussions of the legislative history of the
Clayton Act provisions now codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 3691 (1964). See Brief for
the United States, p. 7, Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966); Brief for the
United States, pp. 44-53, Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958); Brief for the
United States, pp. 20-44, United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964); notes 67-69
supra and accompanying text. See also note 81 supra and accompanying text.
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question. The chief obstacle to a clear delineation of the respective
legislative and judicial roles in the formulation of contempt pro-
cedures lies in the obfuscated conceptual underpinning of the sum-
mary contempt power. Initially, courts and commentators had
argued that the power to punish contempts summarily was neces-
sarily embodied in "the Judicial Power" conferred upon the federal
courts by article II193 as an essential prerequisite of a viable judicial
system and thus was beyond the zone of congressional definition or
limitation.9 4  With respect to indirect contempts, however, the "in-
herency" theory was substantially repudiated in Michaelson v. United
States,95 wherein the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the maximum sentence and jury trial provisions of the Clayton
Act.90 In so doing, the Court held that Congress possessed para-
mount authority to define and regulate indirect contempts as a
necessary incident of the power to establish the lower federal courts
conferred by articles I9 and 111.98 The only limitation upon Con-
93 US. Const. art. III, § 1.
"The Ninth Circuit in Michaelson v. United States, 291 Fed. 940, 946 (9th Cir.
1928), ree'd, 226 U.S. 42 (1924), had argued that "Congress, the agency to exercise the
legislative power of the United States, can, as a potter, shape the vessel of jurisdiction,
the capacity to receive; but, the vessel having been made, the judicial power of the
United States is poured into the vessel, large or small, not by Congress, but by the
Constitution." The court relied upon dicta in In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1894), to the
effect that the power to punish for contempt is an inherent power of the courts and
concluded that the jury trial and sentencing provisions of the Clayton Act were
therefore an unconstitutional limitation upon the courts' inherent powers. 291 Fed.
at 946-47. In Debs the Supreme Court asserted that "the power of a court to make
an order carries with it the equal power to punish for a disobedience of that order,
and the inquiry as to the question of disobedience has been, from time immemorial,
the special function of the court. And this is no technical rule. In order that a
court may compel obedience to its orders it must have the right to inquire whether
there has been any disobedience thereof. To submit the question of disobedience to
another tribunal, be it jury or another court, would operate to deprive the proceedings
of half its efficiency. . . . 'A court without the power effectually to protect itself
against assaults of the lawless, or to enforce its orders, judgments, or decrees against
the recusant parties before it, would be a disgrace to the legislation, and a stigma upon
the age which invented it.'" In re Debs, supra at 594-95 (dictum). See also Frank-
furter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "In-
ferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1016-17,
1028-27 (1924); Cheff v. Schnackenburg, 384 U.S. 373, 384-86 (1966) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting). See generally In re Debs, supra at 594-600.
"266 U.S. 42 (1924).
"Id. at 66-67. See note 35 supra.
9' U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8[9].
"8U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 1. The Michaelson Court found the statutory grant of
jury trial to impose "a valid restriction upon the inherent judicial power of the United
States District Courts," 266 U.S. at 70-71, and observed that "the power to punish for
contempts is inherent in all courts, has been many times decided and may be regarded
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gress' regulatory power recognized by the Michaelson Court was that
under such regulation "the attributes which inhere in [the contempt]
... power and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor
rendered practically inoperative." 99  As a result, while the federal
courts may possess the inherent power to regulate the prosecution
and punishment of direct contempts,100 the courts' power over in-
as settled law. It is essential to the administration of justice. The courts of the
United States, when called into existence and vested with jurisdiction over any subject,
at once became possessed of the power. So far as the inferior federal courts are
concerned, it is not beyond the authority of Congress .... ." Id. at 65-66, citing Ex
parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510-11 (1873), wherein the Court said, "The
moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with
jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this power [to punish con-
tempt] .... These courts were created by act of Congress. Their powers and duties
depend upon the act calling them into existence, or subsequent acts extending or limit-
ing their jurisdiction." See also Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904);
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 595 (1895); Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31, 36
(1890). See generally RAPALJE, CoNTEMPT § 4 (1890); Note, 11 VA. L. REv. 639 (1925).
00266 U.S. at 66. The significance of the Michaelson enunciation of the range
of potential congressional limitations upon the contempt power may be more con-
centual than substantive, for no attempt was made to define the "attributes which
inhere" in the contempt power. If one of these attributes is wide discretion as
to the procedural safeguards to be employed in disposition of a contempt action,
the Court's pronouncement would leave Congress without meaningful regulatory
power. However, the Supreme Court's subsequent use of the Michaelson prece-
dent recognizes a broad range of traditional judicial powers subject to congres-
sional regulation. For example, in Sprague v. Ticoni Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-65
(1939), the Court used the Michaelson interpretation to establish that principles
employed in English equity courts at the time of the Constitution are applicable in
the federal court subject to limitation by statute. See also Green v. United States,
356 U.S. 165, 202 (1958) (dissenting opinion). Despite the breadth ascribed to the
Michaelson endorsement of congressional regulation of contempt procedures, some
commentators seem unwilling to concede that the federal courts will expose the gamut
of traditional judicial powers to legislative limitations. See Van Hecke, Trial by
Jury in Equity Cases, 31 N.C.L. Rtv. 157, 172 (1953); Note, 74 HAgv. L. Rxv. 1176,
1177 (1961).
For a comprehensive survey of the acts of Congress inhibiting the exercise of
judicial power, see Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 94, at 1018-20 & app. I, 1059-1100
(1924). See generally Comment, 43 CoRNILL L.Q. 622 (1956).
100 The power of courts to regulate direct contempts has received only slight
modification of its common law form. FED. R. CRiM. P. 42 (a) specifically preserves a
court's right to dispose of a direct contemnor summarily. The only significant limita-
tion upon this power has been judicially rather than legislatively imposed. Harris
v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965) (see note 31 supra), limits the category of con-
tempts which can be disposed of without hearing or notice to those which present
an immediate interference with judicial administration. In addition, limited con-
traction of the traditional view of what constitutes "in the presence of the court" has
been imposed. Compare Savin, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 267 (1889) (contempt occurring in
hallway of court house deemed "direct"), with Farese v. United States, 209 F.2d
312 (1st Cir. 1954) (threatening conversation in hallway not "in the presence of the
court'). See also Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
Furthermore, despite the Green-Barnett-Cheff evolution of jury trial procedures in
indirect contempts, no positive judicial reference has been made to a similar safeguard
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direct contempt would appear to be restricted to taking interstitial
action consistent with underlying legislative intent. Since Michael-
son upheld Congress' power to modify the courts' discretionary
power over criminal contempt by delineating maximum sentences
and according jury trials, it would seem axiomatic that a congres-
sional intent that this discretion should remain unlimited would
not exceed Congress' authority. Therefore, unless Mr. Justice Clark
sub silentio resurrected the "inherency theory," implementation of
the Cheff directive, to the extent that its mandate would contravene
a statutory prescription or clear congressional policy, would seem
to constitute an unwarranted invasion of Congress' legislative func-
tion by the Supreme Court.10 1
for direct contempts even though the need has been argued. See GOLDFARB 291, 301-
02; Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 846, 858 (1956). Since a direct contempt, by definition,
occurs in the presence of the court, the potential interference may be sufficient to
justify continuation of the broad power currently available for summary disposition
of this variety of contempt. See Harris v. United States, supra at 164; Beale, Contempt
of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 HARv. L. Rxv. 161-67 (1908); Tefft, supra note 54,
at 131. At a minimum, the category of immediate disruptions delineated by the
Harris rationale would appear to be most efficiently disposed of by summary prosecu-
tion. The delay and inconvenience attendant an empanelling of an independent fact-
finder seems unnecessary, since the judge has empirically examined the interference and
has witnessed its effect upon the principal proceeding. See Beale, supra at 161-67. Even
those suggesting curbs on judicial discretion in the disposition of direct contemnors
are unwilling to concede that all summary procedures be eliminated. See GOLDF5U
301-06; Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 846, 858 (1956).
101 Any resultant conflict between the Chefi directive and existing statutes and legis-
lative intent, or even the mere disregard of such a potential conflict, would seem to
raise a significant separation-of-powers question. Frankfurter and Landis, in con-
sidering congressional authority to regulate the judicial contempt power, recognize that
"at the bottom of our problem lies the doctrine of the separation of powers." Frank-
furter & Landis, supra note 94, at 1012. This doctrine has never been employed as a
direct basis for invalidating an act of a governmental branch. Cf. Principality of
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168
(1880); Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See generally HAINES, THE
AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY '(1959); WADE & PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 21-35 (6th ed. 1960); Fox, Separation of Powers, 5 WASH. & LEE L. Rlv. 185 (1948);
Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 94. Some members of the Court have proposed that
congressional intent be accorded a "relevant and highly persuasive" weight when alloca-
tion of authority between the legislative and judicial branches is at issue. Cf. Glidden
Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 542 (1962) (Harlan, J.); 49 CORNELL L.Q. 122 (1963). This
view, when evaluated in light of the premise of the doctrine of separation of powers
that "the persons intrusted with power in any one of these branches shall not be per-
mitted to encroach upon the powers of the other," Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra at
190-91, would seem to compel the Supreme Court, particularly after its Michaelson in-
terpretation, to give deference to the expressed congressional objectives as to allowance
of jury trials in contempt proceedings. At a minimum, the Court would seem obliged
to choose the congressionally designated alternative-amendment of rule 42-which could
achieve the Cheff result without the encroaching implications attendant to that decision.
See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
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Regardless of the resolution of the foregoing substantive ques-
tions, Mr. Justice Clark was similarly adumbrative with respect to
the proper remedy for a breach of the directive. In situations where
a trial court has imposed a sentence exceeding six months im-
prisonment without providing a jury trial, a reviewing court would
appear to have two alternatives: either to exercise its revisory power
to reduce the sentence to six months or to remand for retrial before
a jury. Under the Barnett rationale, the latter alternative would
have been compelled since the contemnor would have been denied
his constitutional right to trial by jury by the imposition of the
initial sentence, a right which could not be divested through the
mere reduction of the penalty imposed.10 2  However, since the Cheff
directive is not constitutionally bottomed, it is probable that ap-
pellate courts will generally resort to the reduction of sentences in
light of the expense and delay attendant remand and retrial. 0 3
Moreover, the prevailing opinion's promulgation of the directive
"under the peculiar power of the federal courts to revise sentences in
contempt cases"' 04 may indicate that this was the sole remedy en-
visaged.10 5
If reduction of sentence is the remedy adopted, however, a con-
temnor would have a right to trial by jury whenever a "non-petty"
sentence was to be imposed, but that "right" would be unenforceable
202 In the usual case where the defendant had been wrongly denied the right to
jury trial, the decision is reversed and remanded for jury trial rather than being modi-
fied through a reduction in sentence. See, e.g., Wilson v. Bohlender, 361 U.S. 281
(1960) (military trial); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (same); District of
Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930) (remand for new trial affirmed); Latiolais v.
United States, 129 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1942) (memorandum decision) (Congress had not
conferred jurisdiction on the district courts to try petty criminal offenses without a
jury); Smith v. United States, 128 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1942) (same); Freeman v. United
States, 227 Fed. 732 (2d Cir. 1915) (trial by jury means having same judge and jury
throughout); Low v. United States, 169 Fed. 86 (6th Cir. 1909) (waiver of trial by jury
invalid).
103 The appellate courts have resorted to reduction of sentence with regard to those
cases in the course of appeal at the time of the Cheff decision. United States v. Harris,
367 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1966) (per curiam); United States v. Temple, Nos. 10653, 10654,
10655, 10656, 10693, 4th Cir., November 17, 1966; Schnurman v. United States, No.
20411, D.C. Cir., April 7, 1967.
10 384 U.S. at 380. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
"o' The preference of appellate revision over remand for a jury trial is supported
by the Court's statement that "nothing we have said, however, restricts the power of
a reviewing court, in appropriate circumstances, to revise sentences in contempt cases
tried with or without juries." 384 U.S. at 380. Unless the Court in some way intended
a revision of contempt sentences by virtue of the directive, all mention of the revisory
power in the opinion would be superfluous, for the grant of a new trial in no way
involves the revision of sentence-conviction and judgment alike are vacated.
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on appeal if denied by the trial court. This result might be sup-
ported on the grounds that the imposition of a sentence greater than
six months in length, absent a jury trial, arguably is analogous to
the infliction of a sentence in excess of a statutory maximum for
which the proper remedly is reformation of the sentence 0 On the
other hand, the more persuasive argument would appear to be that
the imposition of a "non-petty" punishment conclusively determines
that the contempt involved is sufficiently severe to require the jury
trial safeguard prerequisite to the imposition of a "serious" pen-
alty. 10 7 Therefore, the appellate court would be required to remand
for retrial by a jury in all cases. The foregoing rationale would
seem to comport more closely with the directives's raison d'etre that
serious penalties and "civil disabilities" should not be imposed with-
out the protection afforded by a jury.108
010 When a court has imposed a sentence in excess of statutory limits the most often
used remedy is reduction by the appellate court. See Robinson v. United States, 333
F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1964); D'Allessandro v. United States, 90 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1937);
Simmons v. United States, 89 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1937); Johnson v. United States, 32
F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1929); Spirou v. United States, 24 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1928). In the
remainder of cases, the appellate court has remanded with a direction to resentence
within the statutory limit. See Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382, 389 (1897)
(dictum) (new trial granted for other reasons); Kitt v. United States, 138 F.2d 842
(4th Cir. 1943); Millich v. United States, 282 Fed. 604 (9th Cir. 1922); Wechsler v.
United States, 158 Fed. 579 (2d Cir. 1907); Whitworth v. United States, 114 Fed. 302
(8th Cir. 1902).
1107An analogy can be made to the increased-sentencing cases wherein the penalty
originally imposed becomes the maximum permissible upon a retrial; the first trial
judge is deemed to have determined the maximum seriousness of the defendant's
offense. See Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225, 235 (W.D.N.C. 1966), 1966
DuxE L.J. 1172. The reverse of this argument is that the infliction of "non-petty"
punishment conclusively determines that the contempt is in fact serious and thus the
defendant is entitled to a jury trial on remand. See also note 102 supra.
"'3The initial imposition of a "non-petty" punishment, even if later rejected on
appeal, seems to render conclusive the implication that the offense is of a type to
which procedural safeguards should attach. Reasonable deference to the personal
rights of the defendant would seem to require that the restraints actually placed upon
him be adjudicated within traditional limitations, since he is faced with the possibility
of extended confinement and severe personal degradation. See 384 U.S. at 384-86
(Douglas, J., dissenting); note 55 supra. Furthermore, if safeguards are constitutionally
compelled in instances where particular offenses evince "non-petty" attributes, see
United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 726-27 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting); GOLDFARB
183-84; note 5 supra, these procedural guarantees could not be rendered moot by a
mere discretionary sentence revision by an appellate court, cf. note 62 supra, but
rather would seem to attach irrevocably to any disposition of the case. See also Tefft,
United States v. Barnett, "Twas a Famous Victory," 1964 Sup. CT. Rxv. 123, 135; Note,
63 MICH. L. REV. 700 (1965).
Moreover, the mandatory remand for trial by jury of all contempts wherein the
six-months limitations has been exceeded would also forestall the imposition of such
excessive sentences by a trial court knowing that, at worst, the sentences would merely
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Despite the perplexities generated by Mr. Justice Clark's ra-
tionale, the practical result of the Cheff directive is belatedly to
mitigate the anomalous exemption of criminal contempt from the
constitutionally guaranteed right to trial by jury. The ultimate
removal of this anomaly, however, would seem to require the adop-
tion of the constitutional demarcation urged by Justices Douglas
and Black.10 9  Not only would there appear to exist no satisfactory
analytical distinction between "indirect contempts" and "crimes,"" 0
but the single practical effect of their merger would be to accord the
additional right to trial by grand and petit juries,' Arguably, if
criminal contempt is deemed so "serious" as to require trial by jury,
perforce indictment by a grand jury would also seem required."12
be reduced to six months on appeal. For example, a court which became aware of
the seriousness of the contemnor's act only after deciding not to grant a jury trial might
impose a sentence in excess of six months upon the theory that even if an appeal is
taken, the judgment will in all probability merely be reduced to six months. Since
this is the maximum sanction the judge could have imposed at the original sentencing,
the court's abortive attempt to impose a serious penalty for what was considered a
serious contempt has not reduced the choice of penalties.
100 See 884 U.S. at 391-93 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
120 See note 55 supra.
"'- Previous decisions of the courts have accorded all other criminal procedural safe-
guards. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
222 If criminal contempt is so serious as to require a jury trial, it arguably assumes
the character of a crime and falls within the requirement of the fifth amendment that
"no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. A
crime is made "infamous" partly by the quality of the punishment which may be im-
posed. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885). While the Court has held that an
offense with a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment can be tried without
indictment, Duke v. United States, 301 U.S. 492 (1937), a potential confinement of one
year has been deemed to require fifth amendment procedures, see Mackin v. United
States, 117 U.S. 348, 352 (1886). Thus, the line of demarcation, which fall between
six months and one year, could be expressed in the same terms as the Cheff directive-
sentences exceeding six months. See also Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 165 (1958);
United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922); In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894);
In re Mills, 135 U.S. 263 (1890). However, the mandatory indictment process has
been held to be inapplicable to proceedings in which no "crime" is charged, even
though the prosecution may result in a punishment which would have entitled the
accused to a grand jury hearing had his offense constituted a "crime." See Beland
v. United States, 128 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 676, rehearing
denied, 317 U.S. 710 (1942). Thus, the sui generis nature of contempt arguably
removes that offense from classification as a "crime" and renders the indictment pro-
cedure unavailable. See note 60 supra.
In addition to consideration of the punishment imposed, the Supreme Court has
indicated that the need for a grand jury proceeding also depends upon the conse-
quences to the accused if he should be found guilty. Ex parte Wilson, supra at
423. In light of these criteria, the civil disabilities attaching to contempt prosecutions
would seem sufficiently serious to necessitate the use of indictment procedures. See
note 55 supra. See also GOLDFARB 176-77, 231. Also militating for grand jury pro-
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Moreover, in light of the interpretive dilemmas generated by Mr.
Justice Clark's retreat from a constitutional standard, reliance upon
the Court's discretionary powers to effectuate this amalgamation
would appear to be improvident. At the very least, because of the
manifold and significant questions left unanswered by Cheff, future
conflict and consequent reformulation of contempt procedures appear
both inevitable and desirable.11 3
cedures in contempt cases is the fact that while the fifth amendment specifically ex-
cludes certain actions such as courts martial from indictment requirements, see United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), contempt proceedings are not ex-
cluded. By implication, their potential inclusion under the fifth amendment directive
is without specific impediment.
The Supreme Court rejected the "infamous" nature of contempt, reasoning that
the offense was distinguishable from the types of "crimes" which the constitutional
framers contemplated. Green v. United States, supra at 183-85. Not only is this a
questionable interpretation of history, see note 55 supra, but the decision also pre-
ceded the Barnett-Cheff imposition of mandatory jury trials for contempts of a non-
petty nature. Thus, its precedential value produces no compelling conclusion as to the
availability of grand jury indictments.
223lf the Supreme Court desired to preserve a non-constitutional basis for its
reformation of traditional contempt powers, any further alteration to achieve pro-
cedural fairness could be made in the form of an amendment to FED. R. C n. P. 42.
Such a change would be made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1964): "The Supreme
Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe ...rules of pleading,
practice, and procedure ... in criminal cases and proceedings to punish for criminal
contempt of court in the [federal courts] . . . All laws in conflict with such rules
shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect." (Emphasis
added.) Choice of a rule amendment would not only render irrelevant any conflict with
existing congressional intent but would also provide an opportunity for more specificity
in the standards prescribed, for the revised rule could be formulated to cover all types
of contempts and need not be limited to a consideration of the issues in a particularized
judicial controversy.
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